"Case law from other jurisdictions supports petitioner's argument that an access road to an <br />industrial site is an accessory industrial use which cannot be established on residentially zoned land. <br />See e.g., Chelmsford v. Byrne, 371 NE2d 1307 (Mass App 1978); Leimbach Construction Company v. <br />Baltimore, 257 Md 635, 264 A2d 109 (1970); see generally, R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 2d <br />§9. 27 (1976). We find these authorities persuasive. <br />"Based on the foregoing, we uphold petitioner's challenge to this aspect of the city's decision. <br />Establishment of the proposed access road is a use of land zoned R-2. We view the use as one which <br />is accessory to Permawood's industrial plant. The list of permitted uses in the R-2 district does not <br />include such an accessory use." (Underlining in original.) <br />In the present case: <br />1. If any portion of the subject site were to be used as a "Parking Area" for tenants and clients of <br />the existing structure being used as a "Drug Treatment Clinic - Non-residential" that would <br />comprise a "use" of land zoned S-DW. <br />2. That use would be an accessory to a "Drug Treatment Clinic - Non-residential." <br />3. The list of uses in the S-DW zone does not include such an accessory use, i.e., an accessory to a <br />"Drug Treatment Clinic - Non-residential." <br />4. Accordingly, the "Parking Area" on the S-DW-zoned land would not be allowed. <br />Roth v. Jackson County, 38 Or LUBA 894 (2000) <br />From pages 11 and 12: <br />"Petitioner argues that the county cannot permit wineries on the subject property because a <br />portion of the property is zoned SR 2.5 and wineries are not permitted on property zoned SR 2.5 <br />under any circumstance. Petitioner contends that the winery is a use on the entire ownership and <br />winery access is an essential part of the total development plan for the winery. When petitioner <br />raised these arguments below, the hearings officer concluded <br />* * that Tax Lot 101 will house the winery, not Tax Lot 2504, which will continue to be <br />used for access by the subject property and three other parcels.' Record 8. <br />"We addressed a similar issue in Bowman Park v. City of Albany, 11 Or LUBA 197 (1984). In that <br />case, the subject parcel was zoned for industrial use and the parcel providing access was zoned for <br />residential use. The city's decision found that access to the industrial portion of the property did not <br />constitute a "use" for zoning purposes, and therefore was allowed outright in all zones. There, we <br />relied on cases from other jurisdictions to hold that "an access road to an industrial site is an <br />accessory industrial use which cannot be established on residentially zoned land." Id. at 203. The <br />facts in Bowman Park are analogous to the situation here. A parcel providing access to a winery is an <br />accessory use to the winery. Because wineries are not allowed in the SR 2.5 zone, an access road to <br />the winery may not be established on the SR 2.5-zoned parcel. The hearings officer erred in <br />concluding that access was a totally separate activity from the winery. <br />"The fourth assignment of error is sustained." (Underlining added.) <br />The conclusion in this case is even simpler and more definitive than Bowman Park with respect to the <br />subject site: <br />1. An area providing a "Parking Area" for a "Drug Treatment Clinic - Non-residential" is an <br />accessory use to the "Drug Treatment Clinic - Non-residential." <br />ZVR 20-1 (Conte) Additional Application Material #4 Page 3 January 7, 2010 <br />