present case, the "Parking Area" use would be permitted on the S-DW portion of the subject site only <br />when the principal use of the existing structure on the site is a use permitted in the S-DW zone. <br />LUBA decisions. <br />LUBA has issued three decisions that bear directly on the issue of an "accessory use" relationship to a <br />"principal use" where the principal use is permitted on one portion of the site, but not on the portion <br />where the accessory use is proposed. The three decisions are: <br />• Bowman Park v. City of Albany, 11 Or LUBA 197 (1984) <br />• Roth v. Jackson County, 38 Or LUBA 894 (2000) <br />• Wilson v. Washington County, 63 Or LUBA 314 (2011) <br />Bowman Park v. City of Albany, 11 Or LUBA 197 (1984) <br />From pages 5 to 8: <br />"1. Access <br />"Permawood's plant lies east of the principal collector street in the area, Geary Street. Site <br />access from Geary Street is to be provided by developing a connecting road across the land <br />immediately south of the proposed plant. This land (Tax Lot 7100 and a portion of Tax Lot 7000) is <br />owned by Permawood but is zoned for residential use. <br />"At the city's hearings, petitioner objected to use of residentially zoned land for industrial site <br />access. In response, the city determined no zoning violation was presented because site access did <br />not constitute a'use' for zoning purposes. Alternatively, the city concluded that if industrial access <br />was a use disallowed by residential zoning, the access proposal was nevertheless authorized by <br />virtue of the historical use of the land by vehicles entering and leaving the industrial enterprises in <br />the area. The following finding sets forth the city's position on the access issue: <br />* * * * [Excerpt from city decision] <br />"The initial question presented is whether the county [sic] properly construed the applicable <br />law, here the zoning ordinance. [Footnote 4] Where questions of ordinance construction are <br />involved, we give weight to the interpretation given by the local legislative body, provided the <br />interpretation is reasonable. Miller v. City Council of Grants Pass, 39 Or App 589, 594, 592 P2d 1088 <br />(1979). <br />"We have difficulty accepting the city's claim that establishment of a road to accommodate <br />traffic serving an industrial site does not constitute a use of land. The zoning ordinance does not <br />expressly equate access with use, as respondents point out, but the ordinance does define 'use' in <br />terms broad enough to encompass the establishment and maintenance of the private road in issue <br />here. The phrase 'use' is defined by the ordinance to mean <br />"'The purpose for which land or a building is arranged, designed or intended, or for which <br />either land or a building is, or may be, occupied or maintained.' Article 22, Albany <br />Development Code. <br />"We note also the term 'development' in the city's ordinance is defined to include <br />establishment of a right of access. Id. A development permit is required when an access road is <br />established. Id. Section 7.120. We perceive close similarity, if not identity, between the words 'use' <br />and 'development' in the city's ordinance. <br />ZVR 20-1 (Conte) Additional Application Material #4 Page 2 January 7, 2010 <br />