Hearings Official Decision - Laserfiche WebLink

determine the plain meaning of words such as "disperse" or "motor vehicle traffic" does not transform the clear and objective standard into a discretionary exercise. Nor does taking account of evidence in the record with regard to the current condition of West Amazon make application of the standard less clear and objective. In connection with these conclusions, I decline to delve into the offered legislative history of the 19 lot rule because it is my opinion that the text and context of EC 9.8325(6)(c) is sufficient to resolve the competing arguments. At the heart of Mr. Kloos's definitional argument is that the term "disperse" does not have a spacial aspect. He argues, based on the Webster's Third New International Dictionary definition, that the potential to move in more than one direction from a given location is sufficient to "disperse" vehicular traffic. He specifically asserts that the Hearing Official should not make policy of the fly by making a determination about how far a vehicle must travel before it is dispersed enough to meet the 19 lot rule. There are at least two problems with Mr. Kloos's argument, one definitional, and one evidentiary. Although Mr. Kloos offers the "1a" part of the Webster's definition in his argument, there is a second part to the primary definition that has been left out. That part is "1b" which states: "to cause to become spread widely." Taking this part of the definition of "disperse" into account contradicts the argument that it is enough that traffic can move in both directions along West Amazon from the proposed PUD. Mr. Kloos concedes that such traffic could only travel 1000 feet to the barrier on West Amazon - but he urges that even such a short distance is enough to meet the standard. By this logic the standard could be met if traffic could travel even one block to an existing cul-de-sac. This interpretation is contrary to the both the "1a and 1b" definition of "disperse" as used in EC 9.8325(6)(c). The Hearings Official agrees with the Planning Commission interpretation offered by staff above. Mr. Kloos would deem the standard to be met even though it sent future residents down the proverbial "Road to Nowhere."' Here, where the "layout" of the PUD relies on only one public street to disperse motor vehicle traffic, that traffic at minimum must be able to go somewhere in two different directions that do not terminate in a dead end. As to the evidentiary problem, the applicant does not provide any evidence to contradict that provided by staff showing that West Amazon to the west of the subject property is not likely to be developed to allow "motor vehicle traffic" at any time in the future if ever. Evidence of prior land use decisions and testimony that the barrier will remain to facilitate a park is unrebutted. Nor was reliable evidence submitted that any of the other local streets along West Amazon might be developed through to Fox Hollow Road to either the north or south of West Amazon. In response to Mr. Kloos's second argument, I agree with the city attorney's analysis as set forth in the November 12, 2105 memo and adopt the reasoning on pages 5-6 (Section II, Subsections A and B) as my own by this reference. In addition, I add two reasons to reject the applicant's position. First, the record contains maps reflecting prior land use approvals on the section of West Amazon west of Fox Hollow Road. It appears that some of the lots created over time were done through the PUD process. In any case, all other factors being equal, the applicant could have developed the Talking Heads, Little Creatures (1985) Hearings Official Decision (PDT 15-1/ ARA 15-13) 15