I users of the site." Record at 25. Petitioner contends the <br />2 record does not support the finding of historical use of Tax <br />3 Lot. 7100 for industrial access purposes. Further, petitioner <br />4 claims that even it that use of the lot once existed, it was <br />S discontinued in 1978 and its resumption is barred by an express <br />6 provision of the city's development cone. Respondents answer <br />7 that substantial evidence supports the city's finding, which <br />8 respondents say includes a determination "...that Tax Lot 7100 <br />9 has been in continuous industrial use from the time of flub City <br />10 Concrete's operation through the continued operations of Oregon <br />II Bartile, to the proposed operation by Permawood." Brief of <br />12 Respondents at 9. <br />13 The parties treat the city's finding of historical use of <br />14 the residentially zoned land for industrial access purposes as <br />13 a determination that the use qualifies as a nonconforming use. <br />16 Where such a determination is made by local government, this <br />17 Board has jurisdiction to review it for correct application of <br />18 law and for evidentiary support;. Foreman v. Clatso (county, <br />19 297 Or 129, P2d (1904) <br />20 For reasons unknown to us, state statutory law provides <br />21 guidance on questions pertaining to nonconforming uses where <br />22 counties are involved but not where cities are involved. <br />23 Co►nr ORS Chapter 215 (county zoning) with ORS Chapter 227 <br />24 (city-zoning). In the absence of a controlling statute, we <br />21; look to the city's development code, which we construe in light <br />26 of judicially recognized principles derived from analogous <br />Pitge 9 <br />