1 166 (1983).1 Here, however, petitioner asserts standing only <br />2 to represent the organization's interests. No claim to <br />3 representational standing is made. <br />4 It is undisputed the challenged permit decisions are <br />g quasi-judicial in nature. Accordingly, the applicable tests <br />6 for standing are as follows: (1) petitioner must file a notice <br />7 of intent to appeal, (2) petitioner must have appeared before <br />8 the local governing body, either orally or in writing, and (3) <br />9 petitioner must have been entitled as of right to notice and <br />10 hearing before the governing body, or be aggrieved or have <br />11 interests that are adversely affected by the decision. ORS <br />12 197.830(3). <br />13 The dispute in this case centers on the adequacy of the <br />14 allegations in the petition with respect to the third test. <br />15 Respondents focus attention on the section of the petition <br />16 entitled "standing." We agree the claims of entitlement to <br />17 notice and adverse impact in that section seem to relate only <br />18 to individual members of the organization, not to the <br />19 organization itself.2 However, we find other parts of the <br />20 petition supply the allegations necessary to support <br />21 petitioner's claim to organizational standing under the test in <br />22 question. <br />23 The factual summary appearing at page 14 of the petition <br />24 indicates petitioner actively participated as a party in the <br />25 city's proceedings concerning this development. Petitioner <br />26 states it appealed the permit approvals issued by both the <br />Page 4 <br />