Court of Appeals Decision - Laserfiche WebLink

1 possession, participation, or use)." Webster's at 793. Based on the dictionary definition 2 alone, the phrase at issue would appear to refer to land that nonresidents are excluded 3 from using altogether or that residents at least have the power to exclude them from 4 using. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that "dictionaries are only the 5 starting point for our textual analysis," State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or 745, 765, 359 6 P3d 232 (2015), and that it is sometimes a mistake to adhere too literally to the dictionary 7 meaning of words, State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or 451, 462, 365 P3d 116 (2015). 8 See, e.g., Kohring, 355 Or at 305, 325 P3d 717 (departing from the dictionary definition 9 of a word, because, in its statutory context, "it seems clear that the legislature did not 10 intend the term to be understood literally") 11 In this context, construing "exclusive" in the literal sense would lead to an 12 absurd result. Taken literally, for acreage to be included in the net-density calculation, no 13 employee could work there, including in common areas of an apartment complex, unless 14 the residents had the power to exclude them, and no guests could visit (even if invited by 15 a resident), unless other residents had the power to exclude them. Such a result does not 16 make sense in context.' Instead, in this context, we understand "reserved for the 4 We are unpersuaded by petitioners' attempt to allow for the presence of guests while advocating for a literal reading of "exclusive." Even if a guest is present at an apartment complex as an invitee of a resident, such that the guest's use may be viewed as a use by the resident, it is still a use by the nonresident as well. For example, if 10 residents and three nonresident guests were swimming in the apartment complex pool one day, we do not see how one could say, in the literal sense, that the pool was being used exclusively by residents. 10