17 <br />1 <br />z <br />3 <br />4 <br />5 <br />6 <br />7 <br />s <br />9 <br />10 <br />11 <br />12 <br />13 <br />14 <br />15 <br />16 <br />17 <br />1s <br />19 <br />20 <br />21 <br />22 <br />23 <br />Id. The same is true here. The City is attempting to legislate through <br />interpretation by inserting terms where they do not exist and ignoring others. <br />Instead of straining the code to its breaking point, the City should amend the <br />provisions it finds to be superfluous. <br />The City then found that: <br />"[t]he leasing office and maintenance building are accessory to the <br />residential use, specifically serving current and future residents as well as <br />employees carrying out functions directly related to maintenance and <br />operations of the residential use. In no way do either structures [sic] <br />constitute a public park or public facilities for the purposes of calculating <br />density." <br />ER-31. First, the City's (and LUBA's) conclusion that an "accessory" building <br />may be included is, again, contrary to the plain meaning of the words "actual" and <br />"exclusive," especially when it is understood that neither building at issue is used <br />solely for residential purposes. Context provided by the definition of "accessory <br />use," defined to mean "a use incidental to the primary use of the development <br />site," supports Petitioner's argument. The dictionary definition of "incidental" is <br />"subordinate, nonessential, or attendant in position or significance: as a : occurring <br />merely by chance or without intention or calculation : occurring as a minor <br />concomitant." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1142. Simply put, <br />"incidental" does not carry the same meaning as "exclusive," and, therefore, it was <br />error for the City and LUBA to find that accessory uses within a residential <br />