1 <br />2 <br />3 <br />4 <br />5 <br />6 <br />7 <br />8 <br />9 <br />10 <br />11 <br />12 <br />13 <br />14 <br />15 <br />16 <br />17 <br />18 <br />19 <br />20 <br />21 <br />22 <br />are not clear and objective, and therefore cannot be applied to the subject <br />application. <br />The city responds that nothing in ORS 197.307 or elsewhere guarantees <br />the Dryers that any proposed development of the subject property will be <br />approved under clear and objective standards. According to the city, where a <br />city has a two-track system authorized under ORS 197.307(6), under the <br />express terms of that statute the applicant is guaranteed only to have the "option <br />of proceeding" under an approval process that applies only clear and objective <br />standards. The city argues that at all times the Dryers had the option of <br />proceeding under the city's needed housing track. The city contends that even <br />if it is the case that a particular type or intensity of development on the subject <br />property is not approvable under the needed housing clear and objective <br />standards, due to characteristics of the subject property such as elevation and <br />steep slopes, that does not mean that the Dreyers have not been provided the <br />"option of proceeding" under the needed housing track, as ORS 197.307(6)(a) <br />requires. <br />Resolving the parties' dispute on this point requires interpreting ORS <br />197.307, examining its text, context and available legislative history. PGE v. <br />Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), as <br />modified by State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). No <br />party cites any context or legislative history, so we focus on the parties' textual <br />arguments. The city is correct that nothing in the text of ORS 197.307 <br />Page 18 <br />