criteria were not clear and objective, I would almost certainly agree with the ACA that I should <br />not find otherwise. <br />In the present case, however, the Willamette Greenway approval criteria were adopted long <br />before the 2017 statutes requiring clear and objective approval standards for all housing (and even <br />before the statutes requiring clear and objective standards for needed housing). Unlike the <br />Chamotee Trails case, the City Council (as far as I am aware) has never determined that the <br />approval standards of EC 9.8815 are clear and objective. In fact it seems odd that the ACA would <br />argue that I could not determine that the EC 9.8815 approval criteria are not clear and objective <br />when she admits as much in her memorandum: <br />“It is not possible to draft clear and objective approval criteria that also require <br />an applicant to comply with phrases like ‘the best possible,’ ‘the greatest <br />possible degree,’ and ‘the maximum possible,’ as required by Goal 15. The City <br />cannot comply with the requirements of ORS 390.314 and Goal 15 and also be <br />limited to the application of clear and objective standards for proposed housing <br />developments within the Greenway.” ACA Memorandum 4. <br /> Again, the question is not so much whether the EC 9.8815 approval criteria are clear and <br />objective (they are not), but whether they trump the needed housing statutes because the proposed <br />development is in the Willamette Greenway. If the City Council or Planning Commission has <br />expressed an opinion on that issue no one has brought it to my attention and I am not aware of any <br />such opinion. The question of what approval criteria apply to a land use application is squarely <br />within the universe of questions a hearings official is required to answer. I do not see that I am <br />precluded from considering the issue. <br /> The applicant has persuasively explained why the EC 9.8815 approval criteria are not clear <br />and objective. Under ORS 197.307(4), this at least establishes a prima facie case that the approval <br />criteria may not be applied to the proposal. Absent some argument that explains why the EC 9.8815 <br />approval criteria nonetheless apply, I have no choice but to agree with the applicant that the <br />approval criteria do not apply. Initially, many of the opponents argue that the Goals have to trump <br />state statutes. These opponents essentially argue that the Goals are akin to a land use constitution <br />or super-precedent that the legislature cannot undue. While the Statewide Planning Goals certainly <br />have a ring of authority to them, they are still just statutorily created goals which can be undone <br />just as easily through other statutory enactments. Furthermore, not applying the EC 9.8815 <br />approval criteria to needed housing applications would hardly overturn or invalidate the goal, the <br />Hearings Official Decision (WG 18-3/SR 18-3/ARA 18-8) 11 <br /> <br />