1 "It is true that, in [Butte Conservancy], we held that a condition of approval to <br />2 construct necessary access through an adjoining subdivision lot in itself did <br />3 not establish that such access was feasible when the legal right to construct <br />4 such access was disputed. However, unlike Butte Conservancy, the hearings <br />5 officer in the present case adopted findings and conditions of approval <br />6 sufficient to demonstrate that sanitary sewer service is feasible. Although <br />7 petitioner argues that he will challenge any condemnation proceeding, Rhyne <br />8 does not require absolute certainty, only a finding that compliance with <br />9 applicable criteria is feasible, and imposition of conditions necessary to <br />10 ensure compliance. The decision properly finds that PZC 33.652.020A.1 is <br />11 satisfied or can feasibly be satisfied through the imposition of conditions." Id. <br />12 at 566. <br />13 Turning back to the present case, the city on remand took essentially the same <br />14 approach as the hearings officer in Stoloff. As in that case, we see no point in addressing the <br />15 parties' arguments regarding the meaning of the Kingswood Heights CC&Rs, because for the <br />16 reasons set out below the city's findings adequately demonstrate that it is feasible for the city <br />17 to condemn the disputed right-of-way, even if it is ultimately determined that the CC&Rs <br />18 prohibit use of the residential lot for that purpose.3 In other words, couched in the analysis <br />19 set out above, the city's findings adequately establish that fulfillment of the condition of <br />20 approval is not precluded as a matter of law, and the city adequately ensured that the <br />21 condition will be fulfilled prior to final development approval. <br />3 Petitioners do not dispute the city's finding that following a lawful condemnation the use of the property <br />for an access road would not be subject to the CC&R restrictions. At oral argument, petitioners questioned <br />whether condemnation is even theoretically possible, since intervenor owns the lot and presumably would <br />dedicate (in fact is required to dedicate) the right-of-way to the local government with jurisdiction, in this case <br />the county. We understand petitioners to suggest that condemnation is a last resort that is reached only if <br />voluntary dedication or conveyance is not possible, and here, it is clear that intervenor is willing and indeed is <br />required to dedicate or convey the right-of-way. We further understand petitioners to argue that if the right-of- <br />way is dedicated or conveyed in some manner rather than via eminent domain, then the CC&R restrictions <br />would continue to apply to dedicated property. Because condemnation will likely never occur, we understand <br />petitioners to argue, the theoretical possibility of employing eminent domain to avoid the CC&R restriction <br />fails to establish that it is "feasible" to fulfill the condition of approval. <br />Petitioners are probably correct that the city's exercise of eminent domain is unlikely. However, the city <br />has adequately demonstrated that it has the legal authority to condemn the disputed right-of-way and thus avoid <br />the legal impediment identified by petitioners. That demonstration is sufficient to satisfy the feasibility <br />requirement of Meyer and Rhyne, as construed here, even if the city is unlikely in fact to ever exercise that <br />condemnation authority. <br />Page 8 <br />