I should only be required to "determine that the legal position is warranted by existing law or <br />2 is a nonfrivolous argument based on existing law." City of Gresham's Response Brief 10-11. <br />3 The city argues that such a test would be similar to the test that LUBA has applied when <br />4 local land use standards expressly require compliance with state agency requirements or that <br />5 the applicant secure a state agency permit. In those cases, the city argues, LU13A has held <br />6 that the local government is not required to establish that the state agency requirements can <br />7 in fact be satisfied. Instead, the local government need only determine that the necessary <br />8 agency permit is "available" and that the applicant is not precluded from obtaining such <br />9 agency permits as a matter of law. Wetherell v. Douglas County, 44 Or LUBA 745, 755-56 <br />10 (2003); Sam Miller v. City of Joseph, 31 Or LUBA 472, 478 (1996); Bouman v. Jackson <br />11 County, 23 Or LUBA 628, 646-47 (1992). <br />12 We generally agree with the city that the Meyer and Rhyne feasibility analysis must <br />13 be applied somewhat differently when the "problem" identified at t$e first stage of a two-step <br />14 approval process is an alleged legal impediment to fulfilling a condition of approval <br />15 requiring facilities necessary for the proposed development, rather than a technical, <br />16 engineering or similar issue. In such circumstances, where neither the local government nor <br />17 LUBA have jurisdiction to resolve the legal question, and that legal question must be <br />18 resolved in a particular way to allow the condition to be fulfilled so that an applicable <br />19 approval standard will be satisfied, neither the local government nor LUBA need engage in a <br />20 detailed or definitive legal analysis. In our view, it is sufficient for the local government in <br />21 such circumstances to (1) adopt findings that establish that fulfillment of the condition of <br />22 approval is not precluded as a matter of law, and (2) ensure, in imposing the condition of <br />23 approval, that the condition will be fulfilled prior to final development approvals or actual <br />24 development. <br />25 Although we did not couch it in those terms, we applied a similar approach in a <br />26 recent case with very similar facts. In Stoloff v. City of Portland, 51 Or LUBA 560 (2006), <br />Page 6 <br />