I persuaded, on this record, that LUBA correctly ruled that the city and county failed to <br />2 follow the McMinnville analysis. That is, the city and county failed to adhere to the <br />3 priorities required by statute and goal. It does not suffice to say that the city and county <br />4 merely considered them. McMinnville, 244 Or App at 266 ("[A]pplication of all of the <br />5 provisions in Goal 14 to the resulting UGB change is required * * Moreover, to the <br />6 extent that the parties argue about. substantial evidence, we have reviewed the record and <br />7 LUBA's decision, and we are persuaded that LUBA properly understood and applied its <br />8 substantial evidence standard. See Barkers Five, LLC v. LCDC, 261 Or App 259, 348, <br />9 323 P3d 368 (2014) ("[O]ur role is not to review * * * for evidentiary support. Instead, <br />10 we determine whether [the board] understood and applied the substantial-evidence <br />11 standard correctly."). Therefore, we do not disturb LUBA's determinations that the city <br />12 and county had not satisfied the requirements under ORS 197.298 and under the Goal 14 <br />13 factors. <br />14 B. Cross-Petition <br />15 We turn to Land Watch's cross-petition and address LUBA's rulings, both <br />16 concerning the city's REA and future employment projections or "forecasts." Land <br />17 Watch characterizes LUBA's ruling as concluding that "Coburg could use two methods of <br />18 calculating the city's industrial land needs and add them together to determine its need for <br />19 a UGB expansion for industrial land, when the methods are legally mutually exclusive." <br />20 We address the cross-petition in two parts, as LUBA did. First, we consider LUBA's <br />21 interpretation of OAR 660-024-0040(9)(a) to determine whether LUBA's interpretation <br />12 <br />