Fred Nilson, Hearings Official <br />July 8, 2016 <br />Page 8 <br />the decision permitting or denying an application will remain <br />constant throughout the proceeding [internal citations onutted]. <br />That protective purpose of the statute would not be seared bST <br />our adoption of the restrictive meaning that petitioners would <br />give the term." Daiwipor-t i~ Clty of Tigard, 121 Or App 135, 140 <br />(1993) (Emphasis mine). <br />LUBA and the Court rejected petitioners' argument, which is similar to the City's <br />argument in the present case, that the amended map did not contain "standards and criteria" <br />within the meaning of the Goal Post Rule. A transportation plan map is certainly not <br />"approval" criteria in the functional sense (as opposed to the "approval" criteria of EC <br />9.724(2)(a)-(c) (2002)). But according to LUBA and the Court in Dai.,etapo>"t, the <br />transportation map fell «ntllln the term "standards and criteria" for purposes of the Goal <br />Post Rule. <br />iii. Kirpal Light Satsang v. Douglas County, 18 Or LUBA 651 (1990) <br />There is a long line of "Kitpal Lglit Satraraf cases dealing with the same set of facts. <br />These relevant facts' are as follows: Property owner submitted documents to the county for <br />the purpose of obtaining building permits to develop the property for a private school in the <br />Farm-Forest (FF) zone, on September 2, 1987. On the date the documents for the private <br />school were submitted, the FF Zone allowed as an outright permitted use "schools" but did <br />not make a distinction between private and public schools. On September 9, 1987 the <br />county amended its land use and development ordinance to make private schools a <br />conditional use rather than a permitted use in the FF zone. The county argued that the <br />documents submitted on September 2, 1987 were not an "application" for a "pernut" that is <br />subject to the county Goal Post Rule (ORS 215.=128(1)). After the Oregon Court of Appeals <br />remanded the case to LUBA, LUBA found that the property owner's September 2, 1987 <br />documents did in fact constitute an "application" for a "permit" that was entitled to the <br />protections of the Goal Post Rule. Kirpal LigI)t Satrarasa, 18 Or LUBA at 659-660. <br />The county argued that the September 2 documents were not an "application" for a <br />statutory "permit" because on September 2, 1987, a school was a nondiscretionary outright <br />permitted use. LUBA disagreed and found that there was legal and factual judgment <br />necessary to determine whether what was proposed qualified as a private school under the <br />terms of the county land use regulations. LUBA held: <br />`Based on our conclusion that the county decision required to approve or deny petitioner's <br />September 2, 1987 application involves sigiuficant discretion, we conclude that petitioner's <br />application was for a "permit" as that term is defined in ORS 215.402(4) and, therefore, <br />3 See Kiita1 Ligbt Salad P. Dou3lar Count 1, 96 Or App 207 (1989) for a fuller set of facts. <br />ACCV <br />