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Last modified
9/6/2017 2:41:35 PM
Creation date
8/12/2016 9:57:08 AM
Metadata
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Template:
PDD_Planning_Development
File Type
CU
File Year
2
File Sequence Number
4
Application Name
Cathedral Park
Document Type
Appeal Materials
Document_Date
8/11/2016
External View
Yes
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Fred Wilson, Hearings Official <br />July g, 2016 <br />Page 6 <br />During the second step of statutory analysis, courts will consider any legislative <br />history proffered for "whatever its worth - and whatever its worth is for the court to <br />decide." State z). Gable,;, 346 Or 160, 170-172 (2009). In this particular case, the Goal Post <br />Rule was adopted as Section 27 of HB 2295 in 1983 as part of a major overhaul of Oregon's <br />recently adopted land use system. The Applicant requested and reviewed the entire <br />legislative history and found no substantive discussion of the provision. The legislative <br />history is silent on this matter and is of no help to either side. <br />Assuming that after examitung the text and context above (including any legislative <br />history) there was still some doubt as to the meaning of the Gal Post Rule, the courts will <br />employ general maxims of construction in aiding their interpretation. State r). Getirles, 346 Or <br />160, 164-165 (2009). Those maxims include the maxim that courts construe statutes so as to <br />avoid absurd results, State i~ 11"alker, 192 Or App 535, 541-542 (2004), and that courts <br />presume that the legislature did not mean to enact a meaningless statute. FDPPO r.,. <br />lVashhl tolz Co., 142 Or App 252, 259 (1996). <br />The City Attorney Merno's proposed interpretation is absurd. It would effectively <br />obviate the very protection the legislature implemented when it adopted the Goal Post Rule. <br />Instead, the City's interpretation would replace the very clear mandate under the Goal Post <br />Rule that the rules (i.e. standard and criteria) goveriung an application's approval are frozen <br />at the time the application is subnutted Xvith a complicated, bi-furcated system where some <br />rules would be frozen while others were not. Under the. City's interpretation a successful <br />applicant at the discretionary permit stage would only be assured of "half a loaf" (i.e. <br />approval of the use) with the other "half a loaf" (i.e. build out of the approved use) subject <br />to whatever later enacted "construction and development standards" the City may choose to <br />adopt and apply. Under the City's interpretation, the protections the legislature sought to <br />implement by adopting the Goal Post Rule are illusory because any subsequently adopted <br />legislation could "move the goal posts." In other words, the City is arguing for an <br />interpretation that would render the Goal Post Rule's protection a "meaningless act." <br />II. Analysis of Caselaw Applying the Goal Post Rule <br />A. Caselaw Not Cited by the City Attorney <br />While the City Attorney Memo cites multiple cases (discussed in Section II.B below) <br />to support its position, it does so in a very casual manner and, perhaps more importantly, <br />fails to cite and analyze three cases that settle the question in the applicant's favor. To be <br />sure these three cases, analyzed below, contradict the City's position as do the cases cited by <br />the City. <br />AG-- <br />
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