14 <br />Or 117, 149 Pad 139 (2006). Hence, while LUBA may look to judicial <br />principles in performing its adjudicatory function, it "may modify sound <br />principles of judicial review or choose not to apply certain principles to ensure <br />that its decision is compatible with the specific statutes and principles <br />governing LUBA's review." Just, 193 Or App at 144 (Emphasis added). In <br />this case, even if the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure governing defaults were <br />general principles governing judicial review and applicable to the motion to <br />intervene in this case (and they are not), LUBA could not rely on these rules to <br />disregard the express provisions of ORS 197.830(7)(a) and (c). As LUBA <br />properly complied with the specific statutes governing its review, its decision <br />dismissing the motion to intervene should be affirmed. <br />The Intervenors-Petitioners also make a policy argument contending that <br />"an appellant could dictate its own opponents by simply not serving any other <br />party and no party would be entitled to recourse." Opening Brief, p. 17. <br />However, this is merely speculation, as the other petitioners were responsible <br />for serving Intervenor-Petitioner Trautman, and not his adversaries. In any <br />case, as the Court of Appeals has said, it is not appropriate to weigh any policy <br />considerations where, as here, the language of the statute is clear in its material <br />respects. Wicks-Snodgrass, 148 Or App at 223. Here, the statute clearly <br />required the motion to intervene to be filed within 21 days of the filing of the <br />Notice of Intent to Appeal, and LUBA properly dismissed Trautman's belated <br />Motion to Intervene. <br />