9 <br />assessed fee was reasonable.") LUBA does not err by applying an <br />unambiguous provision of law in accordance with the plain meaning of its text. <br />See Cogan v. City of Beaverton, 226 Or App 381, 289, 203 P3d 303 (2009). <br />ARGUMENT <br />LUBA correctly applied ORS 197.830(7)(c) in dismissing a Motion to <br />Intervene filed 68 days after the Notice of Intent to Appeal was filed. <br />On January 3, 201.4, the petitioners in the LUBA proceeding filed their <br />Notice of Intent to Appeal. Rec. 873. More than two months later, on March <br />11, 2014, Intervenor-Petitioner Trautman filed his untimely Motion to <br />Intervene. Rec. 824. LUBA denied this Motion to Intervene in its final decision <br />holding that:. <br />"Trautman failed to file his motion to intervene within 21 days <br />after the NITA was filed, and in that circumstance ORS <br />197.830(7)(c) provides that such failure `shall result in denial of <br />the motion to intervene."' <br />Rec 7. ER 5. LUBA's interpretation is correct as a matter of law. <br />In interpreting statutory provisions, the Court of Appeals follows the <br />methodology of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, <br />859 P2d 1143 (1993), as modified by State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 206 P3d <br />1042 (2009). <br />At the first level of analysis, the Court of Appeals looks to the text and <br />context of the statute. PGE, 317 Or at 611. As a second step, the Court of <br />Appeals may refer to any legislative history of the statute that is proffered by <br />