35 <br />The first issue that must be addressed by the City is whether the transportation <br />systems are safe and adequate and whether there are risks to public health and <br />safety. If no such risks are present, then the dedication issue does not even <br />arise. It is only if the question is answered in the affirmative that the City <br />moves on to look at the question of whether dedicated property could resolve <br />the safety risk. If so, then, and only then, does the City look to whether it can <br />require that dedication consistent with constitutional limitations. The city's <br />analysis in this case conflated the two analyses and avoided answering the first, <br />and primary, question of whether the proposed development presents a safety <br />risk by simply finding that nothing could be done in any event. The inevitable <br />result of this approach is to avoid addressing public safety entirely and cannot <br />Nothing in the code supports such an interpretation with respect to the minimum <br />right-of-way. A street such as Oakleigh Lane would either meet the 45-foot <br />right-of-way standard in EC 9.6870, in which case the criteria is met; or to meet <br />the standard, additional right-of-way would have to be dedicated and therefore <br />fall within the language of EC 9.6870. LLIBA's decision allows the City to <br />avoid the question presented by EC 9.8320(5) by applying EC 9.6870 only to <br />property "dedicated" by the applicant, rather than measuring all of Oakleigh <br />Lane against the City's standards. Limiting the application for the criterion in <br />this way actually serves to eliminate it. In short, the City takes the position that <br />it cannot require Oakleigh Lane to have the necessary right-of-way because the <br />Applicant did not dedicate Oakleigh Lane, thereby entirely avoiding the <br />relevant analysis of what standards must be met by Oakleigh Lane to be <br />adequate and safe, as required by EC 9.8320(5). <br />OCTOBER 2014 <br />