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LUBA Materials Volume 1 of 3
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LUBA Materials Volume 1 of 3
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Last modified
4/27/2017 4:32:35 PM
Creation date
7/21/2015 10:49:09 AM
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Template:
PDD_Planning_Development
File Type
PDT
File Year
13
File Sequence Number
1
Application Name
OAKLEIGH COHOUSING
Document Type
LUBA Materials
Document_Date
1/20/2014
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Yes
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redundant. The basic principle here is that if a civic body has enacted laws, each element of the <br />law is presumed to have purpose. <br />This is kno,;AZl as "The Rule to Avoid Surplusage" (i.e. avoiding the interpretation of some parts, <br />of a statute as redundant or irrelevant). <br />Thus, in United States V. Afenasche, 348 U-S.; 528, 538-39 (1955); the Majority of the <br />Supreme Court of the United States (hereafter referred to as "SCO'I-US") invalidated the U.S. <br />Government's attempt to limit the applicability. of a subsection of law governing citizenship. <br />In its decision, the Majority of SCOTUS synthesizes components of two earlier decisions. <br />explaining its reasoning: <br />"The Government's contention that § 405 (a) does not apply to <br />any phase in the processing of naturalization petitions would <br />defeat and destroy the plain meaning of that section. "The <br />cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to <br />destroy." Labor Board v Jones Et Laughlin Stee! Corp., 301 U S <br />1, 30. It is our duty "to give effect, if possible, to every claw <br />and word of a statute," Montclair v.Ramsdell, 107 U.. S. 147, <br />152, rather than to emasculate an entire section, as the <br />Government's interpretation requires. <br />The SCOTUS Majority's language has thereafter been taken to apply generally to govern <br />interpretation of statutory law.. Thus, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 577-78 (1995), <br />the Majority of SCOTUS affirmed: <br />...two rather sensible rules of statutory construction. First; <br />the Court will avoid a reading which renders some words <br />altogether redundant. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. <br />528, 538-39 (1955). If "communication" included every written <br />communication, it would render "notice, circular, advertisement, <br />[and] letter" redundant, since each of these are forms of written <br />communication as well. Congress with ease could have drafted <br />52(10) to read: "The term 'prospectus' means any communication,. <br />written or by radio or television, that offers a security for sale <br />or confirms the sale of a security." Congress did .not write the <br />statute that way, however, and we decline to say it included <br />the words "notice, circular, advertisement rand] letter" for no <br />purpose.. <br />Argument <br />252 <br />
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