Cite as 269 Or App 176 (2015) 183 <br />proceeding by filing a motion to intervene and by paying a <br />filing'fee of $100." <br />Paragraph (b) of ORS 197.830(7), in turn, describes the per- <br />sons who may intervene and be made a party to the review <br />proceedings, including, as relevant here, "[p]ersons who <br />appeared before the local government * * orally or in writ- <br />ing." ORS 197.830(7)(b)(B). Finally, paragraph (c) states <br />that "[f] ailure to comply with the deadline * * * set forth in <br />paragraph (a) of this subsection shall result in denial of a <br />motion to intervene." (Emphasis added.) In applicant's view, <br />the plain text of paragraph (c) is thus dispositive: Because <br />Trautman filed his motion to intervene more than 21 days <br />after the notice of intent to appeal was filed, LUBA was <br />required to deny it. <br />Although that interpretation is certainly reasonable <br />on its face-see Webster's Third New Intl Dictionary 2085 <br />(unabridged ed 2002) (defining "shall," in part, as "used in laws, <br />regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory")- <br />it fails to take into account the relevant statutory context. <br />"We are not to determine the meaning of rules and stat- <br />utes merely by analyzing their meanings in the abstract[.]" <br />Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo v. Warren, 352 Or <br />583, 595, 288 P3d 859 (2012) (citing Lane County v. LCDC, <br />325 Or 569, 578, 942 P2d 278 (1997)). Rather, "[i]t is an ele- <br />mentary principle of statutory construction in this state that <br />we examine the meaning of a phrase in its context." Suchi v. <br />SAIF, 238 Or App 48, 54, 241 P3d 1174 (2010), rev den, 350 <br />Or 231 (2011) (citations omitted). <br />The context of a statutory provision includes, <br />among other things, other parts of the same statute and <br />other related statutes. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or <br />404, 411, 939 P2d 608 (1997). The "same statute" can refer <br />to the same chapter in which a provision has been codified. <br />E.g., Morsman v. Citof Madras, 203 Or App 546, 561-62, <br />126 P3d 6, rev den, 340 Or 483 (2006); see also Pine Ride <br />Park v. Fugere, 252 Or App 456, 461, 287 P3d 1268 (2012), <br />rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013) (considering the provisions of <br />ORS chapter 19 as relevant context for the interpretation <br />of ORS 105.159(3), "even though the latter statute does not <br />expressly refer to them"). <br />